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Cook Islands
The period July 2004 to June 2005
can be described as a year of many
political twisters and natural cyclones
that continue to impact economic,
political, and social programs in the
Cook Islands. The country faced a
series of cyclones, one drawn-out
general election, several closely fought
elections for parliamentary seats,
court petitions, relatively regular
changes in cabinet ministers and port-
folios, two prime ministers, and three
governments. The party that won the
election resurfaced as the opposition
and the prime minister came from one
of the smallest constituencies in the
country.
June 2004 began on a positive note
with a three-day workshop conducted
by the Cook Islands Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the Paciﬁc Islands
Forum, involving government agen-
cies, nongovernmental agencies, and
private-sector companies. The train-
ing reﬂected the spirit of the June
2000 Cotonou Agreement, which
marked the start of a new economic
and political relationship between
the European Union and its African
Caribbean Paciﬁc group for the next
twenty years. Minister of Finance
Tapi Taio described the Economic
Partnerships Agreements as important
in integrating country development
with region-wide economic develop-
ment and in ensuring that the sustain-
able development of the Cook Islands
actually beneﬁts the people (CIN, 3
June 2004, 6). As part of this devel-
opmental process, the Cook Islands
government signed an agreement with
the governments of Australia and
New Zealand. This Cook Islands
initiative, the ﬁrst of its kind in the
Paciﬁc Islands, requires the Australian
Agency for International Development
(AusAID) to pay its ﬁnancial contri-
bution and a management service fee
to the New Zealand Agency for Inter-
national Development, which “will
act as trustee of the funds to be put
into projects of the single co-funded
program” (CIN, 3 Sep 2004, 1). Loan
reserves, projected to reach nz$20.1
million by 30 June 2006, are also
provided so that existing Asian Devel-
opment Bank loans can be serviced as
they come due (CIH, 25 June, 2005, 7).
Planning meetings alone did not
ensure ﬁnancial responsibility, how-
ever, and the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development reiterated its
warning about overspending and
spiraling personnel costs (CIN, 30
June 2004, 1; 17 Jan 2005). Even the
Chamber of Commerce warned of
economic decline if government con-
tinued its overspending (CIN, 9 Mar
2005, 1). Given this general appre-
hension, the nz$2.4 million capital
expenditure budget set for 2005–06
was already receiving much criticism
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from the public at the end of the
review period (CIH, 20 June 2005, 2).
Director of Audit Paul Allsworth
noted that regular departmental over-
expenditures were primarily caused
by poor planning and political inter-
ference (CIN, 17 June 2004, 1.).
Ordinarily this problem could be
solved through the Public Expenditure
Review Committee, which is generally
seen as an important part of govern-
ment’s public transparency. But the
committee has had much of its budget
cut and has no powers to prosecute or
expose wrongdoing discovered by its
audits (CIN, 29 June 2005, 1).
Economic development remained a
major focus for the country, although
certain promising enterprises received
little public support. Tony Napa
unsuccessfully defended his proposal
to establish the island’s ﬁrst helicopter
service, using a Raven 44 ii Clipper
helicopter for tourism, commerce,
government, and emergency services
(CIN, 3 June 2004, 1). Other enter-
prises carried more public support,
including the Captain Bligh resort
hotel in Aitutaki being built by the
Tepaki group, and Virgin Blue’s sister
airline, Paciﬁc Blue, ﬂying from Aus-
tralia via Christchurch to Rarotonga.
Meanwhile Aloha Airlines announces
it was ceasing its ﬂights into Raro-
tonga, ending the direct connection to
Hawai‘i. A bill allowing the issuance
of titles to anyone owning a portion
of a building without being a lessee
(similar to time-sharing) awaits more
discussion. Although ownership of
tourist accommodations is reserved 
for Cook Islanders, foreigners can
access the industry by purchasing
existing businesses that fail to ﬁnd
local buyers.
Overall, the important tourism
industry has brought mixed results
for the Cook Islands. Increased Air
New Zealand ﬂights have led to more
tourists, but also shorter lengths of
stay. Lack of leadership and vision in
government’s management of tourism
development is sometimes cited as a
major concern (CIN, 14 May 2005, 1).
The drawn-out recruitment of a chief
executive and the impact of several
cyclones have also had a negative
impact on the industry. In June 2005,
the board of the Cook Islands Tourism
Corporation reappointed Chris Wong
as its chief executive for a further
three years, launching a major post-
cyclone recovery program. Media
teams from the United States, Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia were
brought in to see that the cyclones
had not damaged the islands’ tourism
infrastructure.
The ﬁsheries sector had some
successes during the year. Cook
Islands Fish Exports signed a multi-
million-dollar deal with a Chinese
ﬁrm, Shanghai Deep Sea Fisheries.
The deal came only a few months
after Sealords withdrew from the
Cook Islands to concentrate on their
New Zealand operations. The Cook
Islands Ministry of Marine Resources
also issued more longline ﬁshing
licenses, to reach the current total of
forty-four, but noted that the maxi-
mum of sixty licenses had yet to be
reached (CIN, 19 July 2004, 1). Five
Taiwanese boats arrived in Rarotonga
to begin ﬁshing in Cook Islands
waters under a tripartite agreement
between Taiwan’s Gilontas Fishing
Company, Cook Islands Fish Exports
Ltd, and the Cook Islands govern-
ment. The twenty-four-meter-long
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ﬁshing boats have twenty-ton storage
capacities, and each carries a crew of
twelve (CIN, 15 Oct 2004, 1).
During the review period, three
Cook Islands registered ships were
turned away from US ports for lack of
compliance with the United Nations
International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code, which had come into
effect a week earlier. The code
“demands international ships have a
signed certiﬁcate from their ﬂag coun-
try that says that they comply with
the new standards aimed at foiling
terrorists” (CIN, 6 July 2004, 1). The
Picton Castle was on her way to a
tall ships festival in Rhode Island,
and sailed instead to Nova Scotia
in Canada. Cargo boat Kwai was
expelled from Martha’s Vineyard 
in Massachusetts, and cargo vessel
Equuleus was denied entry at Provi-
dence, Rhode Island.
Also during the 2004–2005 year,
two leading telecommunication
companies (Eircom and Esat bt)
announced that they would be closing
all direct dialing calls to the Cook
Islands in an effort to crack down 
on Internet fraudsters targeting Irish
consumers (CIN, 22 Sep 2004, 1).
Another important industry, offshore
banking, received a positive impetus
when the Financial Action Task Force
took the Cook Islands off its blacklist
of uncooperative countries, leaving
only Burma and Nigeria on the list
(CIN, 12 Feb 2005, 1).
The agriculture ministry renewed
concerns about the potential damage
to the islands’ coconut trees after dis-
covering a rhinoceros beetle on an Air
New Zealand ﬂight from Los Angeles
and Tahiti. The coconut rhinoceros
beetle (Oryctes rhinoceros) found was
a black female measuring 4.5 centime-
ters long (CIN, 20 Jan 2005, 1). Other
than that, the agriculture sector has
been relatively quiet, with much focus
on nono or noni (Morinda citrifolia),
vegetable gardening, and piggeries. In
May 2005, Rarotonga hosted a suc-
cessful two-day regional meeting of
the steering committee for the devel-
opment of sustainable agriculture in
the Paciﬁc (CIN, 31 May 2005, 1).
Environmental issues were under-
scored by a series of cyclones in
February and March. Although the
main force of Cyclone Meena missed
Rarotonga, it caused serious damage
to Mangaia Island harbor and airport
(CIN, 9 Feb 2005, 1). A week later,
Cyclone Nancy inﬂicted some major
wind and surf damage on Rarotonga
(CIN, 16 Feb 2005, 1). Super Cyclone
Olaf proved even worse than Nancy
in terms of damage to Rarotonga
(CIN, 18 Feb 2005, 1), while Cyclone
Percy badly damaged Pukapuka and
Nassau (CIN, 2 Mar 2005, 1). Cyclone
Rae caused serious damage on Palm-
erston and Pukapuka and prompted
suggestions for the evacuation of
women and children from Pukapuka
and Nassau to Aitutaki (CIN, 23 Mar
2005, 1). The sixth cyclone, Sheila
(tracked 20–23 April 2005), did not
seem to receive the same attention as
the others. The United Nations and
the governments of Australia, New
Zealand, and France offered help to
storm-damaged Cook Islands, and
workers of Cook Islands descent from
New Zealand arrived in Rarotonga to
assist with repairs to damaged houses.
New Zealand cyclone aid amounted
to nearly nz$2 million even before
political reviews • polynesia 131
super Cyclone Percy bore down on
the islands (CIN, 2 Mar 2005, 1). The
government declared a state of emer-
gency, and problems with loiterers
forced ofﬁcials to issue warnings 
(CIN, 3 Mar 2005, 1).
Other environmental related issues
that arose during the year included
lagoon pollution and ﬁsh poisoning.
Ongoing problems of irritation to
swimmers in the Titikaveka area were
ﬁnally linked to bacteria associated
with household sewage and piggery
waste leaking into the lagoon (CIN,
14 Oct 2004, 1). In 2003 there were
227 cases of ﬁsh poisoning reported
in the Cook Islands, of which 169
cases (74 percent) occurred on Raro-
tonga. Forty of the Rarotonga victims
were hospitalized. The number of
patients with ciguatera poisoning
increased from 19 in 1992 to 40 in
2003 (CIN, 29 June 2005, 1).
During the year, traditional leaders
again expressed concern at the use of
Cook Islands cultural images, such as
chants, music, and drumbeats, with-
out consent or proper acknowledg-
ment (CIN, 26 June 2004, 9). Lily
Henderson challenged her sister Marie
for the traditional chieﬂy title of Pa
Ariki, but the court ruled in favor 
of Pa Marie Ariki. Members of the
Taka‘i family also placed a claim for
the Pa Ariki title. Their claim was
also dismissed. Meanwhile, a report
on corruption became a topic of con-
versation. The writers of the report,
Dr Takiora Ingram and Mathilda
Urhle, claimed, “Traditional respect
for elders and leaders is a leading
cause of corruption in the Cook
Islands. . . . This respect stops people
from asking questions about what is
going on.” They also asserted, “Old
habits, family ties, culture and tradi-
tion” set the scene for corrupt prac-
tices (CIN, 21 July 2004, 1).
In July 2004, New Zealand Educa-
tion Minister Trevor Mallard, noting
that Cook Islanders were the second-
largest Paciﬁc ethnic group in New
Zealand, announced the addition of
the Cook Islands Mäori language as
part of New Zealand’s educational
curriculum. He described the Cook
Islands Mäori language as “a precious
gift from the Cook Islands community
to New Zealanders” (CIN, 28 July
2004, 1).
Between July 2004 and June 2005,
politics dominated the news. One of
the most controversial and memorable
political ﬁgures in Cook Islands his-
tory, the ﬁrst premier, the late Albert
Royale Henry, hit the headlines again
when Parliament passed a motion
granting full pardon for all convic-
tions against him. Albert Henry had
lost his leadership position and later
his knighthood after an infamous
1979 bribery case. The forgiveness
extended to Henry by fellow politi-
cians was not generally shared by the
country’s citizens, who have developed
a general apathy toward politicians.
This indifference was reﬂected in a
local press article accusing Prime Min-
ister Dr Robert Woonton of corrup-
tion and improprieties. Local media
owner George Pitt subsequently faced
possible prosecution for publishing a
letter by Woonton to the premier of
the Republic of China following the
prime minister’s state visit there. The
allegations of political corruption and
sexual impropriety were singled out
as libelous (CIN, 8 June 2004, 1).
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The general elections were hotly
contested by Cook Islands Party
(cip), Democratic Party, and a few
independent candidates, with the two
main parties portraying an image of
unity within their ranks. In the
absence of the queen’s representative,
who would normally act on such mat-
ters, the chief justice dissolved Parlia-
ment on the advice of the prime min-
ister, and the general elections were
set for 7 September 2004. During the
campaigning, both major political
parties declared their abhorrence for
coalition government, with the Demo-
cratic Party leadership particularly
adamant on this point (CIN, 17 June
2004, 1). While the Democratic Party
focused on individual commitments 
to organizational goals, the Cook
Islands Party signed agreements with
individual candidates stating that they
would not leave the party after being
elected. The Cook Islands Party
beneﬁted from the open inﬁghting
among Democratic Party members.
One of the victims of this inﬁghting
was Norman George, whose newly
formed Tumu Enua Party failed to win
any seats. In the end the Democratic
Party won 14 seats and the Cook
Islands Party won 9, with 1 seat going
to an independent member (CIN, 6 Sep
2004, 6). The September elections
also included a general referendum,
and Cook Islanders voted to reduce
parliamentary terms from ﬁve years 
to four (CIN, 16 Sep 2004, 1).
While the results of the referendum
were clear, a squabble over the Demo-
cratic Party leadership added an ele-
ment of uncertainty to election results
already complicated by challenges to
Prime Minister Woonton’s seat. After
the election, incumbent Woonton
announced the formation of a new
political party, made up of Health
Minister Peri Vaevae Pare, Education
Minister Jim Marurai, as well as
Teenui Mapumai, Poko Simpson, 
and the independent member for
Rakahanga, Piho Rua (CIN, 1 Dec
2004, 1). This group joined with the
Cook Islands Party, giving them the
parliamentary majority needed to
form a new government, with cip
leader Sir Geoffrey Henry as deputy
prime minister. Not surprisingly, the
Democratic Party severed its ties with
the four members of Parliament who
had switched allegiance after winning
their seats under the Democratic Party
banner (CIN, 3 Dec 2004, 1).
The Cook Islands Party further
increased their numbers in Parliament
after a court appeal awarded the
Titikaveka seat to Tiki Matapo by a
narrow, two-vote margin over Robert
Wigmore. Court intervention also
raised questions about the results of
the Manihiki electorate, and placed
Robert Woonton’s seat in jeopardy.
When the court ordered a by-election,
Woonton was unable to continue as
prime minister and Queen’s Represen-
tative Sir Frederick Goodwin assumed
executive powers pending a meeting
of Parliament (CIN, 13 Dec 2004, 1).
The new coalition government elected
former Atiu mp Norman George as
Speaker of Parliament. They also
elected mp Jim Marurai as the new
prime minister for two years in a
shared agreement that will see Sir
Geoffrey Henry take over leadership
for the second half of the four-year
term (CIN, 15 Dec 2004, 1). The new
prime minister promised political
stability, transparency in government,
and growing prosperity. His govern-
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ment established a new Ministry of
Sports and prepared to celebrate the
fortieth anniversary of Cook Islands
self-government on 4 August 2005.
jon tikivanotau m jonassen
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French Polynesia
Events in French Polynesia in the
period under review were essentially
characterized by political upheaval
and unrest, with an elected govern-
ment ousted in a “legal coup,” only
to return after another by-election.
The country experienced a period of
instability but also an unprecedented
mobilization of peaceful popular
protest, culminating in the largest
demonstration march ever seen in
Tahiti.
Before the crisis started, the islands
were in a state of enthusiasm during
July and most of August 2004. The
new coalition government of the
Union for Democracy (upld), Fetia
Api, and No Oe E Te Nunaa parties
was headed by pro-independence
leader Oscar Temaru, who had been
elected president in June after the
almost twenty-year reign of pro-
French Gaston Flosse. The new lead-
ership’s motto, “Taui” (“change” in
Tahitian) was not only conceived in
the purely political sense but also
reﬂected a determination to set the
whole society on a new course. It
implied a new cultural orientation,
away from the French inﬂuence and
back to the country’s Maohi (indige-
nous Polynesian) roots, as well as
toward a more pan-Paciﬁc perspec-
tive. Three events in particular
embodied these tendencies.
On 12 July, the new government
celebrated the annual autonomy
holiday parade. Thousands of people
participated, while several guests of
honor from other Paciﬁc Islands
countries were present. The new pres-
ident changed the holiday from 29
June to 12 July to honor Francis San-
ford, the father of the territory’s ﬁrst
statute of autonomy of 12 July 1977.
Flosse had made the holiday 29 June
when he created another, enlarged
autonomy statute, which passed on
that date in 1984 (NT, 28 June 2004;
TP, 12 July 2004).
In early August, President Temaru
achieved an even greater triumph
when he attended the Paciﬁc Islands
Forum in Apia, Sämoa, and French
Polynesia was granted long-awaited
observer status in that organization.
The president welcomed the reintegra-
tion of his country into the Paciﬁc
family and invoked his vision of a
more closely integrated Paciﬁc com-
munity in the future. He also formal-
ized the demand that French Poly-
nesia be reinscribed on the UN list
of Non–Self-Governing Territories.
However, he was careful to present
this in his capacity as political party
leader, not as president, in order not
to create tensions with his anti-inde-
pendence coalition partners (Temaru
2004; TP, 6 Aug 2004).
Finally, the Taui also proved its
vitality among institutions outside
the political spectrum, when in mid-
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August the Evangelical Church of
French Polynesia, the country’s largest
denomination, renamed itself Protes-
tant Maohi Church (TP, 16 Aug
2004).
While the dynamism of Taui made
society aware of the dawning of a
new era, the actual business of gov-
ernment was a challenge for Temaru
and his inexperienced collaborators.
Not only were they unfamiliar with
the political system put in place by
Flosse and his French bureaucrats,
but the latter had also used a
“scorched-earth” strategy after their
defeat, leaving almost no records in
the ofﬁces when the new government
moved in (TPM, July 2005). In order
to get an overview of the ﬁnancial
situation of the country, Temaru
ordered an audit by a renowned
French agency. His determination to
uncover irregularities during Flosse’s
administration reportedly scared the
ex-president and his supporters and
made them even more determined 
to sabotage the new government
(Regnault 2004, 153–154).
The crisis began in late August
when two upld representatives in the
Assembly of French Polynesia, Hiro
Tefaarere and Ronald Terorotua, both
with strong labor-union ties, followed
by their colleagues Noa Tetuanui and
Jean-Alain Frébault (who had previ-
ously crossed the ﬂoor from Taho-
eraa), announced their intention to
resign from the upld and form their
own parliamentary group. They
argued that Temaru’s government 
had not kept its electoral promises,
especially in the ﬁeld of social policy.
The second issue that roused their
discontent was the cross installed by
Speaker Antony Geros in the assem-
bly hall, seen by many as an assault
on the secular character of the state
(TP, 13 Aug, 18 Aug, 30 Aug 2004).
Temaru tried to appease the dissi-
dents’ anger by making concessions.
In a dramatic act he personally
climbed on a ladder in the assembly
hall to take down the cross (TP, 17
Sept 2004). Eventually he was able to
reconcile with Tefaarere and Teroro-
tua, and both returned to the assem-
bly’s majority group. Tetuanui and
Frébault, however, refused to do like-
wise and on 24 September they for-
mally resigned from Temaru’s group,
leaving the latter without a majority
in the assembly (TPM, Oct 2004).
Together with independent repre-
sentative Temauri Foster, the two
eventually approached Flosse’s
Tahoeraa opposition, giving it a new
majority. After a televised speech in
which Temaru warned the population
of a planned attempt to overthrow
his government, Flosse declared on
4 October that a “motion of censure
is not on the agenda” (TPM, Oct
2004). However, less than twenty-
four hours later, such a motion was
ﬁled by both Tahoeraa and a newly
founded assembly group called Te Ara
(“The Awakening”), consisting of
Tetuanui, Frébault, Foster, and three
Tahoeraa representatives—apparently
a puppet party set up by Flosse to
give his motion the added legitimacy
of being a two-party initiative (TPM,
Nov 2004).
The extraordinary assembly session
of 8 October, which was called to
debate this motion, became a forty-
eight-hour ordeal. Temaru, with his
ministers and representatives, gave
long speeches testifying to their
achievements, and tried to convince
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Noa Tetuanui to give up his “treach-
ery” and return to the upld, on
whose list he had been elected. But all
attempts were unsuccessful, and late
on the night of 9 October, the motion
of censure passed with a slim majority
of 29 to 28 votes (TP, 9 Oct 2004;
TPM, Nov 2004).
After only four months in ofﬁce,
Oscar Temaru’s government had been
ousted. From then on the situation
became increasingly confusing.
According to the Statute of French
Polynesia, a government overthrown
in a motion of censure remains in
power as a caretaker administration
until the assembly elects a new presi-
dent. However, the two sides could
not agree on a date for this vote to
take place (TP, 12 Oct 2004; TPM,
Nov 2004).
While the parties fought a legal
battle over scheduling the vote,
Temaru and his followers began
to organize their resistance against
Flosse’s return to power. Even before
the vote of censure, Temaru had
asked the French government to
dissolve the assembly and call for
fresh elections in order to create a
clearly mandated majority (TP, 6 Oct
2004). This request was supported by
large sections of the country’s popula-
tion as well as the opposition parties
in France. However, the ruling right-
wing government of French President
Jacques Chirac refused to comply.
French Minister for Overseas Terri-
tories Brigitte Girardin—who had
already contributed to political desta-
bilization in Tahiti after the elections
in May by stating that “the electoral
process is far from being completed”
(TPM, June 2004)—said that there
was no reason for a dissolution as
long as there was no blockade of the
country’s political institutions (TP,
12 Oct 2004).
On 16 October, Tahiti experienced
the largest demonstration in its his-
tory when more than 22,000 people
(ofﬁcial estimate) marched through
the cities of Faa‘a and Papeete to
support Temaru’s call for the dis-
solution of the assembly and fresh
elections (TPM, Nov 2004). Among
the marchers were deputies from the
opposition French Socialist Party, the
most notable being Christian Paul,
former minister for overseas territories
in Lionel Jospin’s left-wing govern-
ment (1997–2002), as well as Hawai-
ian independence activist Henry Noa.
A petition demanding the dissolution
was signed by almost 43,000 people
during the following weeks (TP, 17
Nov 2004). Flosse’s followers, on the
other hand, could mobilize only about
300 participants for a counter-demon-
stration in early December (TP, 4 Dec
2004).
Unimpressed by the October
march, Lana Tetuanui, the assembly’s
third vice speaker from Tahoeraa,
opened an assembly session for the
presidential vote, and on 22 October,
Flosse was unanimously elected presi-
dent. Under Flosse’s orders, the
assembly building had been occupied
by a militia made up of members of
the Groupement d’Intervention de la
Polynésie (gip; see below), who intim-
idated all non-Tahoeraa supporters
present, including Assembly Speaker
Geros (TPM, Dec 2004). Geros con-
tested the legality of the session
presided over by Lana Tetuanui,
as there was no legal basis for his
replacement by one of the vice speak-
ers (TP, 22 Oct 2004). French High
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Commissioner Michel Mathieu, how-
ever, had given written orders to Lana
Tetuanui to open the session (TP, 18
Oct 2004), thereby violating his
required neutrality in local politics.
Finally, on 25 October, the date set
by Geros for the election session (for
which Flosse had ﬁled his candidacy
and thereby implicitly recognized the
illegality of his election on 22 Octo-
ber), Geros himself was absent, as
Oscar Temaru had invited all his rep-
resentatives to a meeting at the presi-
dential palace. Inspired by Gandhi,
they decided to hold a “spiritual fast-
ing” on the palace grounds in order
to underline their continuing demand
for the assembly to be dissolved (TP,
25 Oct 2004).
In the following days, the situation
in Papeete became more and more
tense. On 26 October, Flosse pre-
sented his cabinet of seventeen minis-
ters, almost all of them drawn from
his previous cabinet (TP, 26 Oct
2004), while Temaru declared that he
was still the only legitimate president
since Flosse’s election had taken place
under illegal circumstances. While
Temaru, his cabinet, and a growing
number of supporters held out at the
palace, other groups of upld sup-
porters, led by land rights activists
Joinville Pomare and Clément Pito,
began to occupy public buildings in
Papeete, including the land affairs
ofﬁce, the government printing ofﬁce,
and the government information tech-
nology center (TP, 3 Nov 2004). At
the same time, many public service
employees began to strike and occupy
their own ofﬁce buildings to protest a
situation in which they were receiving
orders from two different govern-
ments and did not know which one to
be loyal to. All this increasingly para-
lyzed the economic life of French
Polynesia. Brigitte Girardin, however,
still refused to dissolve the assembly,
using the argument that there was still
“no institutional blockade,” even
though there obviously was (TP, 23
Oct 2004; TPM, Nov, Dec 2004).
As the blockades continued, both
parties sent delegations to Paris to
advocate their respective positions
(TPM, Dec 2004). The French public
became more and more aware of
events in Tahiti, now featured in
cover stories in the Paris media (Le
Nouvel Observateur, 28 Oct 2004;
Libération, various issues in Oct
2004; L’Express, 7 Feb 2005), which
for the ﬁrst time provided relatively
well-informed, balanced coverage that
was increasingly critical of Flosse and
his system (Regnault 2004, 165–169).
Even within Chirac’s ruling Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire (ump)
party, previously unconditional sup-
port for Flosse began to crumble, as
Béatrice Vernaudon and one other
ump deputy advocated the dissolution
of the assembly (TP, 4 Nov 2004).
While the negotiations were under
way, on 15 November 2004 the
French State Council (highest admin-
istrative court) decided on a com-
plaint ﬁled by Flosse after the 23 May
2004 elections. The council found
that Flosse’s complaint was justiﬁed,
on the grounds that the curtains of
the polling booths in Mahina on
Tahiti’s east coast had the dark blue
color of the mayor’s party, which is
part of upld. According to the ruling,
those colored curtains could have
inﬂuenced the voters, and therefore
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the election in the Windward Islands
constituency (Tahiti and Moorea)
was declared null and void, and a 
by-election called for 13 February (TP,
15 Nov 2004). However, the French
State Council did not follow up com-
plaints by upld concerning the outer
islands, where other important irregu-
larities may have taken place. With
this one-sided action, the council once
more demonstrated that the French
authorities were not behaving neu-
trally. With the decision to hold by-
elections in the Windward Islands,
Temaru and his followers insisted on
fresh elections in all the outer islands
constituencies as well. They also
demanded that until the elections
took place, the country should be
run by an appointed neutral caretaker
administration, in order to prevent
Flosse from using public resources for
campaigning as he had done in previ-
ous electoral campaigns (TPM, Dec
2004).
Several rounds of negotiations in
Paris got nowhere. In the end Flosse
left the negotiation table, arguing that
the public buildings were still occu-
pied by Temaru’s followers, although
Temaru had promised to clear all of
them (TP, 29 Nov 2004).
Frustrated with the failed negotia-
tions, Tahiti’s politicians reluctantly
accepted the status quo and began to
organize for the by-elections. upld,
already comprising four allied parties
in addition to Temaru’s pro-indepen-
dence Tavini Huiraatira, was joined
by two new constituent organizations,
Jacky Bryant’s local Green Party
(Heiura-Les Verts) and Stanley Cross’s
culturalist Te Hono Party (TP, 8 Nov
2004). On the national level, upld
received support from the French
Socialists as well as from all other
left-wing parties (TP, 27 Jan 2005).
While upld’s strength thus seemed
to be reinforced, Tahoeraa became
weakened when two of its collabora-
tors—ethnic Chinese community
leader Robert Tanseau, and Flosse’s
former sports minister and chairman
of the Tahoeraa youth wing Reynald
Temarii—left Tahoeraa to run on
their own tickets (TP, 12 Dec, 20 Dec
2004). Temaru’s former coalition
partners—Philip Schyle’s Fetia Api
and Nicole Bouteau’s No Oe E Te
Nunaa—decided to run on a com-
mon-list-styled Alliance pour une
Démocratie Nouvelle (adn), refusing
the possibility of any governing coali-
tion with either upld or Tahoeraa
(TP, 1 Feb 2005).
In the subsequent campaign,
Tahoeraa once again tried to polarize
voters between the political concepts
of autonomy (implying continuing ties
with France) and independence, pre-
senting the latter as a recipe for chaos
and economic misery and itself as the
only “saviour of autonomy” against
the “evil independentist” upld. In
the pro-Tahoeraa weekly L’Hebdo,
Temaru and his collaborators were
virulently attacked. Similarly, Bouteau
and Schyle were denounced as “false
autonomists” because of their previ-
ous participation in Temaru’s govern-
ment (L’Hebdo, 10 Feb 2005). Both
upld and adn, on the other hand,
tried to avoid the controversial inde-
pendence issue and focus instead on
economic and social issues, criticizing
Flosse’s governance and promising a
better way to run the country. upld
stressed the merits of its previous gov-
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ernment and promised to change the
ways of the country for the beneﬁt of
its people. While Temaru’s ﬁrst gov-
ernment was referred to as the period
of Taui, the period after February 13
was designated Taui Roa (“big
change”) (TPM, Feb 2005; To‘ere,
3 Feb 2005).
Political campaigning even included
the publication of books. In late
2004, political scientist Jean-Marc
Regnault published an analysis of
Oscar Temaru’s rise and fall titled
Taui: Oscar Temaru/Gaston Flosse,
le pouvoir conﬁsqué (“Taui . . . the
power conﬁscated”), denouncing the
complicity of the French state in what
had been called Flosse’s “legal coup”
(Regnault 2004; TPM, Nov 2004).
The ﬁrst printing sold out within two
days. Following this enormous suc-
cess, Tahoeraa severely attacked Reg-
nault, accusing him of partiality and
questioning his academic credentials.
In January 2005, Flosse’s director of
communications, Yves Haupert, pub-
lished his own political analysis as a
reply. Entitled Taui, l’espoir trahi
(“Taui, the hope betrayed”), the work
accused Temaru of incompetence and
having an evil mind, while presenting
Flosse as the country’s “saviour”
(Haupert 2005).
The campaign, accompanied by
multiple provocations and incidents
(To‘ere, 17 Feb 2005; L’Hebdo, 10
Feb 2005), politicized society to a
degree seldom seen before. Almost
all households declared themselves by
hoisting either Temaru’s light blue and
white ﬂag, or Flosse’s orange banner.
On 5 February, the campaign reached
its climax with another mass march
of 15,000 to 25,000 upld supporters
to downtown Papeete (TP, 5 Feb
2005), while Tahoeraa, in consider-
ably smaller numbers, organized
various automobile convoys around
the island to show its presence (TPM,
Feb 2005). On election day, the situa-
tion remained tense, with hundreds
of enthusiastic party supporters
beleaguering each polling station.
This time, however, the authorities
rigidly enforced the rules and banned
any display of political symbolism
within the polling stations.
The election results consolidated
upld support in the Windward
Islands by giving it an overwhelming
victory, more than 6,000 votes ahead
of Tahoeraa. Tahoeraa also lost the
lead in almost all municipalities, while
in 2004 it had still maintained the
majority of votes in most rural dis-
tricts of Tahiti. The political map of
Tahiti turned from orange with some
blue spots to an almost pure blue
(To‘ere, 17 Feb 2005). With 46.94
percent of the votes, upld obtained
the one-third-of-seats majority bonus
and received 25 of the 37 seats in the
Windward Islands constituency, while
Tahoeraa, with 40 percent of the
votes, won only 10 seats. adn, which
had hoped to attract many voters
frustrated by the political polariza-
tion, obtained only 10.56 percent,
less than Fetia Api and No Oe E Te
Nunaa combined in 2004, and just
enough for Bouteau and Schyle to
retain their 2 seats. None of the
smaller parties received the 3 percent
necessary to be eligible for a seat (NT,
14 Feb 2005). The results conﬁrmed
once more, after the mass protests in
October, that the upld’s slight vic-
tory in 2004 was not an accident,
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as Flosse and his Paris supporters
wanted to believe, but rather the ﬁrst
indication of a deeply rooted popular
desire for political change (TPM, Dec
2004).
Oscar Temaru’s new popular
mandate was still hard to translate
into a stable political majority. As the
representation of the outer islands
remained unchanged, with most of
their representatives members of
Tahoeraa, there was still no clear
majority in the assembly as a whole,
with 28 seats for upld, 27 for
Tahoeraa, and 2 for adn (NT, 15 Feb
2005). With adn insisting on their
political neutrality, Temaru was 1 seat
short of an absolute majority. As in
the aftermath of the 23 May 2004
elections, a period of rumors and
uncertainty followed.
Although Flosse had announced
that he would resign if his party lost
the election, he still tried to hold on
to power by all means (NT, 15 Feb
2005). This time, however, his stub-
born behavior met resistance from
some of his own followers. Two of his
ministers, Jean-Christophe Bouissou
and Georges Puchon, openly criticized
his refusal to honor his previous
announcement (NT, 18 Feb 2005).
upld then ﬁled a motion of censure
against Flosse, which was adopted by
the assembly on 18 February with the
support of upld and adn (NT, 19
Feb 2005).
After some more destabilization
attempts by Tahoeraa, Oscar Temaru
was ﬁnally elected president on 3
March with a bare majority of 29
votes. The twenty-ninth vote was cast
by Jean-Alain Frébault, who had once
more crossed the ﬂoor and joined the
upld, suggesting a pattern of oppor-
tunism on his part. Tahoeraa’s sur-
prising counter-candidate, Bora Bora
Mayor Gaston Tong Sang, received
26 votes, while the two adn repre-
sentatives abstained. In his inaugural
speech, Temaru underlined once more
that independence was not on his
immediate agenda. Instead, his gov-
ernment would focus on consolida-
tion of the country’s economy and
reform of the ineffective and inﬂated
bureaucratic apparatus, creating more
transparency in government opera-
tions. The new president also declared
he would govern with the present
majority in the assembly and no
longer insist on fresh elections for
the outer islands (TP, 3 March 2005;
TPM, March 2005).
On 7 March, the change of govern-
ment concluded with the presentation
of Temaru’s new cabinet of sixteen
ministers. As he had in 2004, Temaru
took the portfolios of foreign relations
and municipal development. Vice
President Jacqui Drollet held the
portfolios of tourism and civil avia-
tion. Also familiar from Temaru’s ﬁrst
cabinet were Emile Vanfasse as minis-
ter of ﬁnance and economy; Emile
Vernaudon as minister for postal
services, telecommunications, and
sports; Keitapu Maamaatuaiahutapu
as minister for ﬁsheries and maritime
resources; Jean-Marius Raapoto as
minister for education; James Salmon
as minister for equipment, transport,
and energy; and Gilles Tefaatau as
minister of lands, surveys, and hous-
ing. Newly appointed to the cabinet
were former labor union leader Pierre
Frébault as minister for labor; former
television journalist Ahiti Roomataa-
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roa as minister for agriculture;
Georges Handerson with the portfolio
of environment and disaster preven-
tion; Pia Faatomo as minister of
health; Patricia Jennings as minister
for social affairs; Tina Cross (co-
leader of Te Hono) as minister for
women and family; former boxing
champion Tauhiti Nena as minister
for culture and youth; and Natacha
Taurua as minister for traditional arts
and crafts. Directly taken over from
Flosse’s last cabinet was Louis
Frébault as minister for the devel-
opment of the outer islands—an
appointment seemingly designed to
halt his brother Jean-Alain’s recent
pattern of political switching (TP,
7 March 2005).
A few days later, however, the
new government was challenged by
another serious political crisis. This
was triggered by members of the
Groupement d’Intervention de la
Polynésie (gip, Polynesian Interven-
tion Grouping), a service agency for
public works and security services
under direct orders of the presidency
and created by Flosse in the mid-
1990s. On 9 March, Temaru had
removed from ofﬁce gip commander
Léonard Puputauki, a faithful sup-
porter of Flosse, and replaced him
with his own right-hand man, Robert
Maker. However, gip members
refused Maker entrance to the gip
headquarters. Temaru called on the
mutineers to be loyal to the govern-
ment, but later in March the crisis
became more critical when more than
a hundred gip members with trucks
and bulldozers, led by Puputauki,
blocked the bridge leading to Papeete’s
port facilities, cutting off access to the
country’s oil reserves and thereby
threatening the energy supply. They
demanded that the president recall
Maker and instead appoint Puputau-
ki’s lieutenant, Yannick Boosie. Faced
with a collapse of the country’s econ-
omy, Temaru ﬁnally had to give in to
the mutineers’ demands, a humiliating
experience for the new government.
However, Temaru made Boosie’s
appointment temporary and at the
same time appointed a commissioner
to audit the gip (TPM, April 2005).
These events indicated more clearly
than ever that the gip was not a neu-
tral institution serving community
interests, but a militia under Gaston
Flosse’s personal orders. As such it
was almost impossible for another
government to control and therefore
it represented a constant threat to
political stability. It had been revealed
earlier that an intelligence cell within
the gip had used highly sophisticated
technology to spy on anyone Flosse
was suspicious of, including some of
his own supporters (TPM, Oct, Dec
2004). In controversial testimony
during the political turmoil of Octo-
ber 2004, a former gip member had
even claimed that gip members had
abducted, tortured, and murdered
Jean-Pascal Couraud, a journalist
critical of Flosse who mysteriously
disappeared in 1997 (TPM, Nov 2004).
The 2002 disappearance of Fetia Api
founder Boris Léontieff and some
other party leaders in the Tuamotu
archipelago also remains unexplained
(TP, 20 May 2005; TPM, June 2005).
With one crisis, if not resolved, at
least temporarily deferred, another
soon followed, this time within the
upld and again involving Hiro
Tefaarere. Tefaarere had headed the
assembly as Speaker on an interim
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basis since November 2004, when
Antony Geros, elected in May 2004
for a one-year term, had lost his seat
when the elections in the Windward
Islands were declared invalid.
Although upld once more designed
Geros as its candidate for the position
in the election scheduled for 14 April,
Tefaarere refused to respect this deci-
sion and declared himself a candidate.
Geros received a small majority of 28
votes, against 26 for Tahoeraa’s Lana
Tetuanui and adn ’s usual two absten-
tions, while Tefaarere obtained only
his own vote (TPM, May 2005). Even
if this result did not actually threaten
the government’s majority, it gave
the impression to outsiders that the
upld was having difﬁculty maintain-
ing internal discipline, a situation
exploited and exaggerated by the
opposition press (L’Hebdo, 14 April
2005).
Another issue that came up quite
surprisingly in the course of Taui was
the question of customary leadership.
On 12 March, about thirty descen-
dants of ari‘i (royalty), led by Joinville
Pomare, descendant of Tahiti’s royal
Pomare lineage, demanded the cre-
ation of a “Royal Customary Coun-
cil” as a consultative political institu-
tion. They insisted that the voices of
customary leaders needed to be heard
in a second house besides the assem-
bly, and they cited as models the
Customary Senate (representation 
of Kanak Chiefs) in New Caledonia,
as well as the customary royal insti-
tutions in Wallis and Futuna (TP,
13 March, 4 May 2004). As French
Polynesia is one of the least tradi-
tional societies in the Paciﬁc, such a
proposal is unlikely to ﬁnd support
among the country’s population. The
French wiped out its chieﬂy leadership
more than a century ago, and various
voices denounced the proposals as
advocating a “return to feudal privi-
leges” (TPM, April, June 2005).
More than anything else, the
spirit of Taui represented a signiﬁcant
increase in freedom of expression,
which had been limited in many ways
by Flosse’s authoritarian tendencies.
One issue people now dared to speak
about publicly was French nuclear
testing and its consequences. On 17
May, the nuclear test victims associa-
tion Moruroa e Tatou (MeT) pre-
sented several classiﬁed military docu-
ments showing that the island of
Mangareva was severely contami-
nated as a result of aboveground
testing in the 1960s, yet the French
military had not taken any security
measures to protect the population.
MeT chairman Roland Oldham said
there is now sufﬁcient proof to sue
the French government for compen-
sation. On 27 May, Gaston Flosse,
himself a native Mangarevan, but
thus far a staunch supporter of
nuclear testing, surprisingly demanded
the formation of a fact-ﬁnding com-
mission on radiation on his home
island. Many observers wondered
about his intentions, as during his
presidency Flosse had always refused
to even talk to MeT (To‘ere, 28 May
2005; TPM, June 2005; TP, 17 May,
27 May 2005).
The upld’s return to power also
meant a continuation of a Paciﬁc-
focused foreign policy. While regular
trips to Paris are a necessary part of
government business, Temaru is far
more enthusiastic about traveling to
and maintaining relations with the
neighboring Paciﬁc Islands. He has
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traveled frequently to New Zealand,
and made trips to Hawai‘i and Sämoa
in May and June (TP, 14 May 2005;
PIR, 2 June 2005). As he said at a
press conference in Honolulu, “The
French don’t want us to have a link
with the other Paciﬁc countries. They
want us to ﬂy from Tahiti to Paris—
and that’s all. So we have to work on
our relations with our brothers all
over the Paciﬁc” (Haleakalä Times,
8 June 2005).
Reorienting the political system
also means replacing the technocratic
French administrative style with the
simplicity of the “Paciﬁc Way.” While
the common Tahitian people are likely
to beneﬁt from this reform, Flosse
and other members of the old elite
constantly criticize and ridicule it as
“political amateurism” by “incompe-
tents” (TPM, Nov 2004). Given the
amounts of French aid money avail-
able, it is also hard to resist tempta-
tion. While Temaru as well as many
of his collaborators are working hard
to realize their political program,
many less noble individuals within
the new administration have only
their own beneﬁt in mind. As Tahiti
Paciﬁque editor Alex Du Prel noted
with disapproval, this has lead to
constant power struggles within the
upld and to the cases of corruption
that had become common under
Flosse (TPM, June 2005).
Economically, the new government
is sending a mixed message, encourag-
ing investment, notably in the tourism
industry, while at the same time
stressing the need for all development
to be sustainable and beneﬁcial to the
local community (TP, 19 April 2005).
While it is too early to evaluate the
Taui’s long-term impact on the econ-
omy, the Tahoeraa opposition contin-
ues to promulgate a sinister scenario
of economic downfall, accusing
Temaru of preparing “the cubanisa-
tion of our country” (L’Hebdo,
2 June 2005).
In spite of such criticism, the popu-
lation seems to be favorably inclined
toward the new leadership. In May
2005, an opinion poll showed that
more than half of the population sup-
ported the new government, and that
Oscar Temaru was the most popular
politician (TP, 27 May 2005).
Concerning the long-term political
status of the country, there is still
much confusion about where to go,
even within upld. Temaru personally
favors independence but is aware of
the fact that the majority of the popu-
lation presently supports continued
political dependency on France. He
has suggested a process like that
provided by the Nouméa Accord in
New Caledonia, granting increased
autonomy and leading to a referen-
dum on independence after one or
two decades, when the country will
be economically ﬁt to stand on its
own. Once again, Tahoeraa has
severely criticized this proposal 
(24 June 2005).
Behind all this talk about political
statutes, however, the main problem
remains of how to wean the country
away from the annual French subsi-
dies of 130 billion Paciﬁc francs (more
than us$1 billion), which pay for
almost everything (TPM, June 2005).
One can only hope that the new polit-
ical leadership will have more courage
to overcome this dependency than
previous governments have had.
lorenz gonschor 
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The year 2005 marked the ﬁfth
anniversary of the introduction to the
United States Congress of legislation
known as the Akaka Bill, after its
primary benefactor and one of
Hawai‘i’s senators, Daniel Akaka.
The bill was prompted by litigation
in the US Supreme Court challenging
the Hawaiians-only voting policies
for the state government’s Ofﬁce of
Hawaiian Affairs (oha). In 1997,
Harold “Freddy” Rice, a non-Hawai-
ian rancher, sued the State of Hawai‘i
to challenge its Hawaiians-only policy
for oha elections. The case, Rice v
Cayetano (Benjamin Cayetano was
then governor of Hawai‘i), argued
that the election policy was racist and
unconstitutional, citing the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Rice
appealed his case up the judicial hier-
archy and ﬁnally won a hearing at the
US Supreme Court in early 2000. The
justices sided with Rice, annulled
the state’s policy, and allowed non-
Hawaiians to vote for oha trustees.
In its original conception, the
Akaka Bill was seen as a way of
neutralizing the detrimental ruling
in Rice v Cayetano by recognizing
Native Hawaiians as indigenous peo-
ple of the United States, thus placing
them in the same category as Native
Americans. However, Hawai‘i’s con-
gressional delegation was unable to
push the controversial bill through
Congress in time to preempt the
Supreme Court’s decision in favor
of Rice. Since 2000, non-Hawaiians
have been able to participate in the
election of oha trustees.
Undeterred, Senator Akaka has
revised and resubmitted the bill every
year since 2000. Meanwhile, other
court cases have appeared, challeng-
ing the existence of the Ofﬁce of
Hawaiian Affairs, the Department
of Hawaiian Home Lands, and all
programs, agencies, and federal grants
designed to assist Native Hawaiians.
Five years after its inception, support-
ers of the Akaka Bill continue their
ﬁght and hope for success before
other lawsuits eliminate these support
agencies.
Since the 1898 US annexation of
Hawai‘i, a political and legal rela-
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tionship has existed between Native
Hawaiians and the United States. As
a part of this special relationship, the
United States has created legislative
acts speciﬁc to Native Hawaiians and
has also included Native Hawaiians in
other federal laws pertaining to Native
Americans. Federal recognition of
Native Hawaiians as an indigenous
people of the United States would for-
malize this de facto relationship and
afford Native Hawaiians the same
rights and protections enjoyed by
other Native American nations.
Among the US federal legislative
actions directly relevant to Native
Hawaiians is the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act of 1920, which set
aside approximately 200,000 acres
of land for Hawaiian homesteading.
When Hawai‘i became a state of the
union in 1959, the federal govern-
ment required the newly formed State
of Hawai‘i to adopt the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act. It
bequeathed those lands, along with
some 1.8 million acres formerly
belonging to the Hawaiian national
government (also known as “ceded
lands”), to be held in trust for Native
Hawaiians. These lands (two million
acres total) continue to be under the
jurisdiction of the State of Hawai‘i.
The State of Hawai‘i has also
enacted legislation concerning Native
Hawaiians. The Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs was established during the
state’s 1978 constitutional convention
to manage a portion of the revenues
generated by these “public trust”
lands. Because the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs was intended to serve as a
liaison between Native Hawaiians
and the State of Hawai‘i, the state
allowed a Hawaiians-only voting
policy for the agency.
Although the United States and
its subordinate, the State of Hawai‘i,
demonstrated through these acts
recognition of a special relationship
with the Native Hawaiian people, 
the United States had yet to ofﬁcially
acknowledge its role in the overthrow
of the Hawaiian government in 1893.
One hundred years later, in Novem-
ber 1993, the United States ﬁnally
extended an apology to Native
Hawaiians and recognized that as a
people they had never relinquished
their inherent claims to sovereignty.
Public Law 103-150, known as the
Apology Resolution, sparked a series
of meetings to identify the next step
of a process of reconciliation between
the United States and Native Hawai-
ians. These meetings eventually led
the US Departments of Interior and
Justice to issue a report entitled
From Mauka to Makai: The River of
Justice Must Flow Freely (2000). The
report recommended that the “Native
Hawaiian people should have self-
determination over their own affairs
within the framework of federal law.”
Since its introduction in 2000, the
Akaka Bill has changed signiﬁcantly
and incorporates a process for federal
recognition as well as a process for
establishing a new Native Hawaiian
governing entity. The purpose of the
current bill, the Native Hawaiian
Government Reorganization Act of
2005 (S 147), is “to provide a process
for the reorganization of the Native
Hawaiian governing entity and the
reafﬁrmation of the political and legal
relationship between the United States
and the Native Hawaiian governing
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entity for the purposes of continuing
a government to government relation-
ship.” The bill establishes two agen-
cies within the federal government—
the Ofﬁce for Native Hawaiian Affairs
and the Native Hawaiian Interagency
Coordinating Group—which would
interact with the Native Hawaiian
governing entity and participate in
negotiations between the United
States, the State of Hawai‘i, and the
Native Hawaiian governing entity.
In January 2004, a portion of the
Akaka Bill was excerpted and sepa-
rately established the Ofﬁce of Native
Hawaiian Relations within the ofﬁce
of the US Department of the Interior.
Much like the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, this ofﬁce is meant to serve
as the primary entity through which
the process of reconciliation between
Native Hawaiians and the United
States may continue. The Ofﬁce of
Native Hawaiian Relations is also
meant to function as the lead agency
for the Native Hawaiian Interagency
Coordinating Group outlined in sec-
tion 6 of the Akaka Bill. The group’s
primary responsibility is to coordinate
federal programs and policies affect-
ing Native Hawaiians.
In the reorganization process out-
lined in the bill, the ﬁrst step would
be the creation of a commission of
nine members who must be Native
Hawaiian, be appointed by the secre-
tary of the interior, and have “exper-
tise in the determination of Native
Hawaiian ancestry and lineal descen-
dancy.” This commission’s primary
responsibility would be the prepara-
tion, certiﬁcation, and maintenance
of a registry of Native Hawaiians
who wish to participate in the pro-
cess. Within two years of passage of
the bill, the commission would be
required to submit that registry to 
the secretary of the interior to be
published in the federal registrar.
Those on the certiﬁed roll would be
eligible to elect the interim governing
council.
The interim governing council
would be charged with organizing
and conducting a referendum on the
proposed elements of the organic
documents of the Native Hawaiian
governing entity, which include
(1) criteria for citizenship; (2) powers
and authorities of the Native Hawai-
ian governing entity; (3) privileges
and immunities of the Native Hawai-
ian governing entity; (4) the civil
rights and protection of civil rights
of its citizens; and (5) all other issues
deemed appropriate. Following the
drafting of the proposed organic
documents, the interim governing
council would conduct an election
for the purpose of ratifying the
organic documents. Subsequently, the
documents would be submitted to the
secretary of the interior for approval
and certiﬁcation.
Following certiﬁcation by the secre-
tary of the interior, the United States
would reafﬁrm the political and legal
relationship between the United States
and the Native Hawaiian governing
entity and extend federal recognition
to that entity as the representative
governing body of the Native Hawai-
ian people. After ofﬁcial recognition,
negotiations would begin between the
United States, the Native Hawaiian
governing entity, and the State of
Hawai‘i concerning the transfer of
lands, natural resources, assets; pro-
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tections of existing rights; exercise
of government authority; civil and
criminal jurisdiction; and delegation
of governmental powers and authori-
ties to the Native Hawaiian governing
entity by the United States and the
State of Hawai‘i.
The bill also includes a few dis-
claimers and restrictions. For exam-
ple, gaming and access to current or
future Bureau of Indian Affairs pro-
grams or assets would be prohibited,
and a twenty-year statute of limita-
tions would be placed on all claims
against the United States.
In the face of another four years
under a Republican administration,
Hawai‘i’s Democrat congressional
delegation and sponsors of the Akaka
Bill were concerned over its fate.
However, Hawai‘i’s Republican gov-
ernor, Linda Lingle, has become one
of the bill’s most fervent supporters,
and in October 2004 Senator Akaka
and his fellow senator from Hawai‘i,
Daniel Inouye, were able to secure an
agreement with US Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist (Republican-
Tennessee) and Senator Pete Dominici
(Republican-New Mexico) that the
Akaka Bill would have its time for
debate on the Senate ﬂoor before
7 August 2005.
Governor Lingle openly lobbied for
the Akaka Bill both in Hawai‘i and in
Washington dc. At the beginning of
the 2005 congressional session, Lingle
personally went to see opponents of
the bill to dispel any misinformation
and to push for a full debate on the
matter. In her words, “The Akaka
Bill is fair and just—nothing more,
nothing less” (Honolulu Advertiser,
13 July 2005).
With Lingle’s support, Akaka and
the bill’s other supporters have also
secured several cosponsors from the
Republican Party: Senators Norm
Coleman (Minnesota), Lindsey
Graham (South Carolina), Lisa Mur-
kowski (Alaska), and Gordon Smith
(Oregon). The bill needs 51 votes to
pass, and there are 47 Democrats and
4 Republican cosponsors. If the bill
can come to a vote in the Senate,
Akaka is conﬁdent that there are
enough votes to pass it.
The October 2004 agreement
between Akaka, Inouye, Frist, and
Dominici allegedly came about after
Akaka and Inouye promised to vote in
favor of opening the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge to oil development. In
March 2005, Akaka and Inouye were
two of three Democrats that crossed
party lines and voted to open the area
for drilling. When questioned, Akaka
and Inouye stressed that they believed
“their votes represent the position of
a majority of the native peoples in the
region” (Camire 2005). On 9 March
2005, the Akaka Bill was passed
unanimously by the Senate Indian
Affairs Committee. But at the end of
the review period, and in spite of the
October 2004 agreement, the bill is
not scheduled for debate on the US
Senate ﬂoor until September 2005.
With an impending debate on the
controversial bill, critics have stipu-
lated further amendments. For exam-
ple, the US Justice Department is
demanding (1) explicit language either
precluding future claims for lands for-
merly held by Native Hawaiians or
shortening the twenty-year statute of
limitations for claims; (2) no interfer-
ence with military operations (includ-
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ing those on disputed lands); (3) reit-
eration of the prohibition of gambling
rights; (4) clariﬁcation of jurisdiction
over criminal matters; and (5) a pro-
vision allowing non-Hawaiians to
serve on the registry commission.
Other opponents of the legislation
fall into two general categories:
Hawaiian national independence
groups and anti–afﬁrmative-action
groups. The former argue for com-
plete independence from the United
States, which cannot be achieved
through US domestic laws. The latter
argue that such legislation gives
Native Hawaiians unwarranted rights
and is unconstitutional and racist. In
a letter to his constituents (an extract
of which was published in the Hono-
lulu Advertiser), Arizona Republican
Senator John Kyl characterized the
bill as a “recipe for permanent racial
conﬂict . . . motivated by a desire to
immunize government preferences for
Native Hawaiians from constitutional
scrutiny under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Rice v. Cayetano,
2000” (Kyl 2005).
Supporters continue to stress the
protective aspects of the Akaka Bill,
especially in light of pending litigation
that could invalidate all programs and
agencies that aid Native Hawaiians.
In fact, they argue that the bill would
enable Native Hawaiians to exercise
direct control over those same pro-
grams and agencies, and would con-
tinue the reconciliation process with
the United States by allowing Native
Hawaiians the same rights and
responsibilities currently recognized
for Native American nations. Support-
ers of this domestic legislation want
to remain within the framework of
the US Constitution and believe that
going to the United Nations, as some
opponents suggest, is futile because
the United States refuses to participate
in international arbitration.
One of the main champions of
federal recognition and the Akaka
Bill has been the Ofﬁce of Hawaiian
Affairs. This state agency has taken
out costly, two-page, color ads in
local newspapers listing organizations
and individuals who support the bill.
To encourage people to sign up for
Kau Inoa, a native Hawaiian registry
(one that would ostensibly become
the registry mentioned in the bill), the
Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs has staffed
tables at community events, craft
fairs, and concerts, and has run tele-
vision and radio commercials offering
t-shirt prizes to those who sign up.
The Ofﬁce of Hawaiian Affairs also
sponsored a documentary by local
director Edgy Lee called The Hawai-
ians: Reﬂecting Spirit, a “one-hour
primer on the spiritual, historical and
cultural bonds between Hawaiians
and their native lands” (Tsai 2005).
In addition, the agency is planning a
$32 million, 60,000-square-foot cul-
tural center in downtown Honolulu.
History shows that the United
States has treated Native Hawaiians
like Native Americans in the creation
of federal acts speciﬁc to Native
Hawaiians and in the inclusion of
Native Hawaiians in several Native
American legislative acts. What sup-
porters of the bill are looking for is
protection from litigation and the
transfer of currently available assets
from the State of Hawai‘i and the
federal government to a Native
Hawaiian body. For others, this
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legislation is either too much or not
enough to address Hawai‘i’s unique
history. Some opponents argue that
granting special rights to a group of
people is racist and unconstitutional.
Others argue that it is not the place
of the United States to legislate self-
determination, and that in fact this
move negates the process. In any case,
the crux of the congressional debate
lies in the question, are Native
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Wallis and Futuna
Wallis and Futuna High Commis-
sioner Christian Job successfully
addressed the territory’s ﬁnancial
recovery by imposing an eleven-point
protocol, which, among other things,
obliged civil servants to accept a two-
year freeze on promotions and a
cancellation of overtime, and also
decreased school support. For its part,
the French State agreed to ﬁnance
half of the deﬁcit (a$600 million).
These measures generated much con-
fusion, for instance, regarding how
much of the responsibility for school
costs parents have to assume; some
Wallisians and Futunans felt that the
local government, drawing largely 
on money from metropolitan France,
should continue to fund transport and
partial food allowances. Three minis-
ters and the faipule (village leader) 
of Hahake, who sided with France
regarding the school funding reforms,
were relieved of ofﬁce on 1 April
2005 by the Lavelua (paramount chief
of Wallis), who replaced them with
more conservative ministers.
In January 2005, Tomasi Tuuga-
hala, one of the grandsons of the
Lavelua of Wallis, was sentenced to
eighteen months in prison for invol-
untary manslaughter following a car
accident. His mother, Etua (the Lave-
lua’s daughter), refused to accept the
sentence handed down by the French
courts because Wallisian customary
law allows a faihu (amiable settle-
ment) to be reached with the victim’s
family. Since the gendarmerie (national
police) had been ordered to arrest the
young man, she encouraged her son
to seek refuge with his grandfather. 
A similar situation had occurred in
2001, when another of the king’s
grandsons had taken refuge in the
royal palace after being found guilty
of rape. The French authorities ﬁnally
abandoned both cases.
Some customary law authorities
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considered Tomasi Tuugahala to be
above French law since he is a descen-
dant of the 86-year-old Lavelua.
Others noted that, while the 1961
statute conﬁrmed the authority of
Wallisian customary law, it did so
only so long as it was not contrary to
the French penal code. They thought
that Tuugahala should give himself up
and that the king should eventually
abdicate or be deposed. The New
Caledonian satirical magazine Le
Chien Bleu wrote scathingly, “Some
customary law ofﬁcials like to invoke
Wallisian customary law when it suits
them and love of France when their
wallet is empty” (No. 83, June 2005).
The crisis increased a notch on 13
May 2005 when the Grande Chefferie
(the Great Assembly) of Wallis
demanded that the high commissioner
and chief justice leave the territory
and wanted the Territorial Assembly
to be closed. A delegation of chiefs
went to the royal palace but was
unable to see the Lavelua. With
approval from Paris, High Commis-
sioner Job suspended monthly
allowance payments to the Lavelua
and those customary law ministers
who supported him in refusing to
turn his grandson over to the authori-
ties. On 16 May one man was seri-
ously injured in clashes between
Lavelua supporters and those who
support change in customary law.
On 22 May a second council of
ministers was named by those village
chiefs who felt that the Great Assem-
bly had made a mistake. They chose
not to designate a new Lavelua. It is
interesting to note that while the title
of Lavelua is not hereditary, the
current king, Tomasi Kulimoetoke, 
is the ﬁrst out of a long line of rulers
to have reigned for more than forty
years. The initial stage of the custom-
ary law crisis ended on 7 June, when
two squads of gendarmes (that is,
forty French national police ofﬁcers)
were sent from New Caledonia to
separate the antagonists, and the
wanted man gave himself up to the
French authorities. For the annual
Free French ceremony on 18 June,
the second council of ministers was
present in the administration court-
yard, while the original council
assembled at the Lavelua’s palace.
During the Wallisian royal family
crisis, the two Great Assemblies of
Futuna (Sigave and Alo) took a stand
against the Lavelua and requested
once again the creation of a vice
prefecture and a local branch of the
Territorial Assembly so that they
would no longer be dependent on
Wallis.
On 20 June 2005, Pope Benedict
XVI named a replacement for Bishop
Lolesio Fuahea, who retired after
more than thirty years of service.
Monsignor Ghislain de Rasilly will
be invested during a big religious
celebration in August 2005. Born in
Juvardeil, France, the 61-year-old de
Rasilly arrived in New Caledonia in
1973 and has been stationed in Fiji
since 2003 as the provincial represen-
tative for the Oceanian Marists.
With no increases in French sub-
sidies, economic activity in the terri-
tory stagnated. Effectively the only
employment opportunities were in
the civil service, and even there dras-
tic decreases in the amount of possi-
ble overtime created many problems
for employees. Two bingo games
developed, despite a prohibition on
gambling. While the administration
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imposed ﬁnes for these activities, the
Lavelua’s daughter, Etua, gave them
customary permission. Meanwhile,
business boomed for Caledonian
billionaire politician Didier Leroux,
who has established a monopoly on
food products for his Sofrana ship-
ping and General Import retail
companies.
In late May 2005, the founder and
managing director of the Technic-
Import Company ﬁred a cashier after
he noticed a deﬁcit of 6 million cfp
francs. Union members immediately
confronted his company. Union leader
Antonio Kulifatai explained on rfo-
Wallis television that it was not really
theft if the accused was in need. The
protestors left without any trouble
when the gendarmes arrived on 
7 June.
On 28 July 2004, the Southern
Moana container ship belonging to
the Caledonian company Paciﬁc
Direct Line ran aground on Futuna’s
Leava Reef. A tugboat was dispatched
from Fiji but was unable to free the
ship. Eventually, the vessel was pulled
off the reef by a tugboat from Bris-
bane, with the loss of only 3 of the
512 containers on board. Meanwhile,
the chiefs appeared to have aban-
doned their attempt to create an
airline.
According to the author of an arti-
cle in Tahiti Paciﬁque Magazine in
December 2004, Futuna is still the
“lointaine île oublié”—the distant
and forgotten island (Jean-Daniel
2004). Among other things, the
author noted obsolete means of trans-
portation and communication, espe-
cially the de Havilland aircraft that
has ﬂown between Wallis and Futuna
since 1987. He also wrote about the
deteriorating quality of health care
and noted that no kind of surgery
was possible on Futuna. 
The Wallis and Futuna community
in New Caledonia is looking to
become part of the “common destiny”
extolled in the Noumea Accord, as
well as to preserve its own heritage.
During an intergenerational meeting
of the Wallis and Futuna Association,
an organizer noted, “A lot of young
Wallisians are either born in New
Caledonia or have mixed parentage.
They don’t really know anything
about their background or traditions
anymore” (Les Nouvelles Caledoni-
ennes, 15 Feb 2005). The Wallis and
Futuna community in New Caledonia
was showcased in a Thursday-night
open-air market in downtown
Noumea (called “Jeudi du Centre-
Ville”), which featured paintings by
Soane Patita Takaniua as well as
sculptures by Patrice Kaikilecofe.
On the political front, Anne-Marie
Siakinuu, a teacher representing the
Avenir Ensemble party, became presi-
dent of the permanent commission of
the New Caledonian Congress in July
2004. In May 2005, three of the four
communitarian parties (Mouvement
des citoyens calédoniens, Union
océanienne, and Rassemblement des
Océaniens dans la République)
decided to merge under the leadership
of Tino Manuohalalo and create the
mur party (using the ﬁrst letter of
the name of each old party).
The Wallis and Futuna community
in metropolitan France continued to
grow, with the approval of locally
elected ofﬁcials. Chief Corporal
Patelise Falevalu from Futuna was
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one of nine French soldiers killed in
the Ivory Coast on 6 November 2004.
He was part of the Second Infantry
regiment of the French marines
involved in UN-sanctioned Operation
Unicorn, and was killed during the
bombing of Bouaké by the Ivorian
government’s army. 
The Wallisian-language website 
run from Canada by Filihau Asi
Talatini is facilitating the emergence
of a borderless cultural community
<www.uvea-mo-futuna.com>.
frédéric angleviel 
Many thanks to the Institut des
Mondes Océaniens et Australasiens
for covering the cost of translating
this review.
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